22. While such efforts as seemed possible were being made to prepare the land defences for the programme which had been laid down by the Prime Minister and accepted everywhere by the people—“ we shall fight in the fields and in the streets ... we shall never surrender ”—the battle had begun in the skies of Britain. The first attempt made by the Luftwaffe was to destroy its only remaining rival, the R.A.F. It was reasonable to assume that with the air strength of her enemy destroyed, Germany could negotiate the passage of the Channel for her troops and rapidly overwhelm the armed forces remaining in Britain, thereby completing her control, not only of Western Europe, but of the eastern Atlantic as well. The month of July passed by while the German reorganization in Europe was taking place and the battle did not begin till 8th August. The first three weeks were spent in an attempt to knock out the R.A.F. The R.A.F., however, had against the Luftwaffe three very great advantages, which together just counterbalanced the numerical superiority of the latter: the great superiority of their morale and training, the technical excellence of the Spitfire fighter, and radiolocation. As the enemy bombed day after day, their losses mounted and proved quite disproportionate to the damage inflicted, until in early September they changed their targets.
23. Long-range strategic bombing is something the Germans have never very seriously attempted. In the early days of war production very great dividends might have been obtained by a really intense study of the industrial organization of Britain and by the choice of targets for their military and industrial value alone. Instead the enemy relied as he had earlier relied in Spain, and as he was again and again to rely in Britain, upon terror attacks, meant to subject the morale of the people of Britain to an intolerable strain. The material damage done was great, but not enough ; that done to the Luftwaffe proved too much to be borne. The loss of 185 planes on 15th September led them to abandon the daylight skies to the R.A.F., though their night attacks grew in intensity. By 31st October the Luftwaffe had lost a known total of 2,375 planes. Meanwhile production was being carried on and increased in spite of the strain of fatigue, the hampering of communications and supplies, and further dispersal.
24. During the whole of this period the German preparations for seaborne invasion were proceeding. Large numbers of troop-carrying barges and other vessels were being assembled in the Channel ports and the forces to man them were being grouped. All of them received incessant blasting from the air, as the bombers took their part with the fighters to defeat the intended invasion.
25. The Battle of Britain can reasonably be called the decisive battle of the war in the sense that with its loss the Axis lost the chance of an all-out victory. Success in it would have meant for Hitler the power to dominate all European production for war purposes, including shipbuilding, with no fear of air attack. The power of the British Navy based upon Canada to have defended North America against blockade and ultimate invasion at this period before the development of the U.S. two-ocean navy would have been uncertain, while the Japanese assault upon Pearl Harbour might well have come a year earlier. The Russian resistance to German assault would have been infinitely more difficult. In general the power of humanity to avoid complete domination by the Axis might well have declined below the essential minimum. Successful defence in the Battle of Britain was the precondition without which none of the subsequent successes would have been possible, either to her or to her Allies.
26. The air attack on Great Britain did not cease with the failure of the enemy in the Battle of Britain. Throughout the winter of 1940-41 the assault went on, still characterized by the brutal but essentially inefficient technique of indiscriminate bombing of concentrated urban areas. Casualties were heavy, there was much damage, much industrial damage even, but the attacks were essentially attacks upon morale, and they failed. Towards the spring the shortening nights and the need for reorganization and preparation for the intended attack upon Russia led to a slackening in the German air effort against this country. The pattern of German strategy had been upset and had to be remade on a new plan.
