10 Mosquitoes to DÜSSELDORF and 2 to Bonn. 2 aircraft lost, one from each target.
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Bomber Command was now ready for what would prove to be its greatest test of the war. The all-out assault on Berlin began on the night of 18/19 November and Sir Arthur Harris would be allowed - with only small exceptions - a completely free hand in pursuing his main aim for the next four and a half months. Bomber Command would mount thirty-two major raids on Germany during this period, sixteen on Berlin and sixteen on other large cities. Nearly all of these raids would be to distant targets and the bomber crews would have to contend both with a succession of long flights in wintry weather conditions and with a succession of fierce battles against a reorganized German night-fighter force. On the technical devices front, it would be a major test for the new models of H2S now being fitted to the Pathfinder aircraft; only one of the thirty-two major raids of the Battle of Berlin period would be to a target within the range of Oboe.
The main battle against Berlin was not a week old before the German defences forced a major part of Harris's bomber force to be withdrawn from the front line of operations. The Stirlings, with which most of the 3 Group squadrons were equipped, had never been able to achieve the altitude performance which the other types of bombers could attain and had suffered heavier casualties accordingly because they had never received the full protective cover of the bomber stream. The Lancasters and Halifaxes were often ordered to come down lower and share the more dangerous lower height bands with the Stirlings but, when the night fighters struck, most of the Lancaster and Halifax crews quickly climbed again. In the period from August to the third week in November, the Stirlings lost 109 aircraft in raids on Germany, a loss rate of 6.4 percent. As their bomb load was not as good as the other types, it was decided that the Main Force would operate without the Stirlings from then onwards. The Stirlings never flew again to Germany. This was a sad period for 3 Group, which had borne its full share of Bomber Command operations since the beginning of the war, but most of its squadrons were now relegated to secondary work during the long period in which a very slow conversion to Lancasters took place.
A similar fate was soon to befall those squadrons of 4 and 6 Groups which were equipped with the Mark II and V versions of the Halifax bomber. These aircraft, too, suffered from having inferior performance and, after the Stirlings left, their casualties soared. In an eleven-week period from the beginning of December to mid-February, no less than 9.8 percent of Halifax II and V sorties to Germany were lost. (These figures do not include aircraft which signalled that they were coming down in the sea, and the losses quoted are expressed as a percentage of those which took off. The true losses on operations would be much higher than the 9.8 percent quoted because up to 10 percent of a force often turned back before crossing the enemy coast.) The Halifax squadrons with the heaviest losses in January 1944 - the worst month - were 434 Squadron with a 24.2 percent loss rate, 102 Squadron with 18.7 percent, 76 Squadron with 16.7 percent, 77 Squadron with 15.0 percent and 427 Squadron with 13.9 percent. 427 and 434 Squadrons were Canadian. After a bad raid to Leipzig on the night of 19/20 February, when the Halifax IIs and Vs suffered more than 16.0 percent casualties, Sir Arthur Harris felt that he could not ask the crews of these aircraft to face the German defences again and ten more squadrons disappeared from Bomber Command's front line, although a few Halifax IIs continued to fly with one of the Pathfinder squadrons.
These two depletions cost Harris approximately 250 aircraft, about one third of his total strength of heavy bombers and at least 20 percent of his bomb-carrying capacity. This serious reduction of strength at the time of Bomber Command's greatest test was only partly compensated for in a steady increase in numbers of Lancasters and of the more reliable Mark III version of the Halifax, but most of the new production of these aircraft was required to replace casualty losses.
The period covered by the Battle of Berlin was to be the high tide of success for the German night-fighter force, rather surprisingly and disappointingly so for Bomber Command after the obvious setback caused to the German night defence by the introduction of Window only a few weeks earlier. Before this new device destroyed the German reliance on their box system, it had been the German practice to place their best crews in the most favourable boxes. These crews quickly built up their score of successes and became the much publicized and decorated 'Experten' of the night-fighter force. This force had been expanding all through 1942 and 1943 but, until the introduction of Window, the newer crews were usually stand-bys or reserves, rarely given a chance in the best boxes. So, when Window rendered the box system obsolete by blinding the radar sets upon which the system depended, the unknown mass of more junior German crews did not regard Window as a setback; to these men, Window was the liberating force which gave them as much chance of finding and shooting down R.A.F. bombers as the Experten. There are many ex-Luftwaffe night-fighter aircrew who believe that Window was the finest gift that could have been given to the German defences. It forced the Germans to send their fighters 'freelancing' on the bomber routes into and away from the cities being attacked, each German crew using its own initiative to find the bombers. The single-engined Wild Boar fighters had already been doing this in the target area for some weeks but, although the Wild Boar force was expanded and played an important part in the Battle of Berlin, these fighters were not to become the dominant factor. Attrition to the single-seater fighters, flying by night, with few navigational aids, in wintry weather, was high; landing accidents in particular were numerous. It was a slightly different tactic, called by the Germans Zahme Sau or Tame Boar - which was to cause the destruction of so many R.A.F. bombers. The whole essence of Tame Boar was to provide the twin-engined night fighters with every possible assistance to find the bomber stream, either on the way to the target or on the return flight of the stream to England, and then leave it to the skill of the individual fighter crews to find and engage the bombers. The Germans would have nearly 400 such fighters in action before the Battle of Berlin was over, each with radio and navigational equipment, a good flying endurance and a radar set which would soon be improved to allow it to penetrate Window. Every night-fighter crew now had the same chance of success. They did not all become experts but, after the first few shaky flights, many developed a flair for this type of action and scored steadily. The effect was cumulative. The German crews gained both in numbers and skill; the bomber losses mounted steadily. The heaviest Bomber Command loss of the war would come on the last night operation of the Battle of Berlin.
A typical Tame Boar operation would start even before the bombers took off. A sophisticated radio-listening service could tell the approximate number of bombers being prepared for operations by monitoring the short signals produced when each aircraft's radio set was tested. The approach of the bombers over the North Sea could be plotted by radar, with the radar not plotting individual aircraft but following the image of the Window cloud - the whole essence of the German use of radar in this period was to plot the location and course of the bomber stream as represented by the cloud of Window. The night fighters were ordered up and they used a network of radio beacons to find their way across Germany and were often held over certain beacons until the future course of the bombers became clear. There were special German reconnaissance units whose Junkers 88s attempted to find the bomber stream at an early stage and fly alongside the stream without attacking, sending back to the German control rooms a steady stream of information instead. Other special units of 'illuminators', Junkers 88s again, flew above the bomber stream dropping strings of flares to attract the main night-fighter force to the scene of battle. And all the time, the German control rooms were gathering information and broadcasting a 'running commentary' to the night fighters, describing every move made by the bomber stream and attempting to forecast its future movements.
Bomber Command followed every German development and attempted to fight back. The Stirlings and old Halifaxes which no longer flew on major raids carried out major minelaying operations, dropping masses of Window as they flew across the North Sea to simulate the approach of a large force. Sometimes the training groups flew a large exercise operation over the sea, turning away before reaching the German coast. The main bomber force was sent by increasingly indirect routes, with frequent course changes; the neutrality of Sweden was sometimes ignored in wide sweeps to the north on the route to Berlin. The duration of the bombing period over the target was cut again and again until 800 aircraft could pass over the target in less than twenty minutes! The bomber stream which, when first established in 1942, was considered to be a great risk when it was 300 miles long, was now only 70 miles long. The radio-countermeasures force was increased, the main object being to jam the German running commentary. Fighter Command was asked to send more and more Intruders to German airfields. A new group was formed, 100 (Bomber Support) Group under Air Commodore E. B. Addison, a signals expert. It was the last group to be formed in Bomber Command and to it were posted the radio-countermeasures squadrons and several Mosquito fighter squadrons so that Bomber Command could directly control the Intruder and Serrate effort. All these tactical developments took place during the Battle of Berlin.
(Because, tactically, this was such an interesting period, more detail than normal on the Bomber Command planning and the German defence reaction is included in the diary entries of major raids.)
The story of the Battle of Berlin is of a steady deterioration of effectiveness by the bomber force at increasing cost. The main offensive against Berlin was fought between
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and flew Lancasters from East Kirkby until the end of the war.
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
630 Squadron flew 2,453 Lancaster sorties and lost 59 aircraft (2.4 percent) in 180 bombing and 22 minelaying raids. 11 further Lancasters were destroyed in crashes.
635 SQUADRON
SERVICE
Formed as a Pathfinder squadron in 8 Group on
