when thirty-seven aircraft were lost in unfavourable weather conditions. Air Vice-Marshal J. E. A. Baldwin, the long-serving commander of 3 Group, acted as the temporary commander-in-chief from 9 January to 21 February until the Air Ministry appointed a more permanent successor.
During the restriction on operations imposed on Bomber Command after that heavy loss raid in November, the whole future of the R.A.F.'s strategic bombing campaign was debated at the highest level, with ideas and views being forcefully exchanged between the War Cabinet, the Air Ministry and other interested parties. Bomber Command could do little but carry out a few modest operations throughout the winter months and await the outcome of the debate. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Bomber Command stood at its second great crossroads in the war, with the whole future of the force being in doubt. The first occasion when the concept of the British strategic bomber might have been abandoned had been when Bomber Command was forced to discontinue daylight bombing and turn to the concealment of darkness early in the war. Now, with night bombing seemingly unable to hit the targets and incurring an increasing toll in aircraft casualties, the validity of retaining a large bomber force was again being considered.
There were many who wanted Bomber Command cut back to a modestly sized force of a more tactical nature, and their arguments had some merit. Britain's entire war effort was fully stretched. The continuing support of a large force of strategic bombers which was clearly a long way from playing the decisive role claimed for it by the bomber leaders was possibly a luxury that Britain could not afford at this stage of the war. The supporters of strategic bombing restated their old arguments. The only way to win the war was to defeat Germany. The bombing of Germany on a scale sufficiently great to cause a German domestic collapse was the only alternative to a costly invasion and a prolonged continental land campaign. The memories of the stalemated years and bogged-down offensives of the First World War haunted the minds of many leaders in this second war with Germany. Had not the Chiefs of Staff declared, in July 1941 after the Germans attacked Russia, 'We must first destroy the foundations upon which the German war machine runs - the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it and the hopes of victory which inspire it. Only then shall we be able to return to the continent and occupy and control portions of his territory and impose our will upon the enemy … It is in bombing, on a scale undreamt of in the last war, that we find the new weapon on which we must principally depend for the destruction of German economic life and morale.'
It would take time, but new aircraft of better performance and greater bomb-carrying capacity and revolutionary new navigational aids were now appearing. In the meantime, Bomber Command represented the only part of Britain's armed forces which could hit Germany in the West and bring some support to the Russians who were fighting so fiercely on the Eastern Front. In the last months of 1941, the Air Ministry produced a new plan backed by a mass of statistics. Forty-three leading German cities, all of industrial character and with a combined population of fifteen million people, were to be subjected to continuous air attack. A force of 4,000 bombers would be required to complete this task satisfactorily. The new navigational devices would enable the targets to be found and hit. Although no one specifically said so in 1941, the attempts to bomb individual factory or military targets would have to be abandoned. The general destruction of the cities themselves would be Bomber Command's objective. Once the force of 4,000 bombers was provided, claimed Sir Charles Portal in a report to Churchill, Germany would collapse in six months. This claim was too much for Churchill. He would continue to back Bomber Command at its present strength and in carrying out its present policies, but there could be no diversion of such a massive requirement of resources to provide and maintain a force of 4,000 bombers.
But Portal had achieved his primary objective. He had secured the support of Churchill - and hence of the War Cabinet which Churchill ruled - for the continuance of Bomber Command in a strategic role. What he needed now was a new tactical policy for Bomber Command and a new man to put that policy into practice. In this way did Bomber Command survive the crisis of that period and commence a new course of action that would occupy entirely the middle years of the Second World War.
The Air Ministry could now devote itself to the means by which the reprieved Bomber Command was to continue its campaign. The next decision was a momentous one. There had always been a body of opinion which believed that the general bombing of German cities, if on a large-enough scale, would produce such general dislocation and breakdown in civilian morale in the target cities that the German home front would collapse. With their cities and their own homes in ruins, the German civilians would be neither able nor willing to continue the war; so went the argument. The Butt Report had showed that accurate bombing of specific industrial premises could only rarely be achieved. The Air Ministry decided that such bombing should be virtually abandoned and most of Bomber Command's effort should now be devoted to the general bombing of the most densely built up areas of Germany's cities. The famous 'area bombing' directive was sent to Bomber Command on
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when a large force was sent out in bad weather conditions, but the proportion of the force lost in the Cologne raid - 3.9 percent - though high, was deemed acceptable in view of the perfect weather conditions which not only led to the bombing success but also helped the German defences.
Bomber Command later estimated that 22 aircraft were lost over or near Cologne - 16 shot down by Flak, 4 by night fighters and 2 in a collision; most of the other losses were due to night-fighter action in the radar boxes between the coast and Cologne. Bomber Command also calculated the losses suffered by each of the three waves of the attack - 4.8, 4.1 and 1.9 percent - and assumed that the German defences were progressively overwhelmed by bombing and affected by smoke as the raid went on. Further calculations showed that the losses suffered by the operational training unit crews - 3.3 percent - were lower than the 4.1 percent casualties of the regular bomber groups and also that those training aircraft with pupil pilots suffered lower casualties than those with instructor pilots!
Another Victoria Cross was awarded for an action on this night. A Manchester of 50 Squadron, piloted by Flying Officer L. T. Manser, was caught in a searchlight cone and seriously damaged by Flak on the approaches to Cologne. Manser held the plane steady until his bomb load was released and, despite further damage, set course for England although he and his crew could have safely baled out after leaving the target area. But the Manchester steadily lost height and, when it became obvious that there was no hope of reaching England, Manser ordered his crew to bale out, which they all did safely. In holding the plane steady for the last man to leave, Manser lost the opportunity to save himself and was killed. He is buried at Heverlee War Cemetery in Belgium.
INTRUDER OPERATIONS
In a major effort to help the bomber force attacking Cologne, 34 Blenheims of 2 Group, 15 Blenheims of Army Co-Operation Command and 7 Havocs of Fighter Command attempted to attack German night-fighter airfields alongside the bomber route. No particular success was gained by these Intruders and 2 of the Blenheims were lost.
Total effort for the night: 1,103 sorties, 43 aircraft (39 percent) lost. (The 7 Havoc sorties of Fighter Command are included in these figures but have not been added to the statistics at the end of the current period of the diary because they did not take place directly under Bomber Command control.)
