KIEL
27 Wellingtons; many hits claimed on shipyards. Kiel reports 6 people killed and 17 injured. No aircraft lost.
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6 Blenheims to Holland; 2 aircraft bombed a merchant ship near Ijmuiden but no hits reported. No losses.
Operational Statistics, 10/11 February to
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(30 days/nights)
Number of days with operations: 21
Number of nights with operations: 16
Number of daylight sorties: 94, from which 2 aircraft (2.1 percent) were lost
Number of night sorties: 1,635, from which 26 aircraft (1.6 percent) were lost
Total sorties: 1,729, from which 28 aircraft (1.6 percent) were lost, but 70 further aircraft crashed in England
Approximate bomb tonnage in period: 1,517 tons
Averages per 24-hour period: 57.6 sorties, 0.9 aircraft lost, 50.6 tons of bombs dropped
Official History, Vol. IV, pp. 132-3.
Bomber Command now suffered a new diversion from its main campaign. German successes at sea, particularly by U-boats on the North Atlantic convoy run, had been running at a dangerously high figure in recent months. Nearly 900 British, Allied and neutral ships carrying stores for Britain had been sunk by German naval forces and aircraft since the fall of France the previous summer. The Royal Navy was short of escort vessels; there was not yet even continuous surface-escort cover for convoys over the whole Atlantic run. Long-range air escort was non-existent. The German battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were out in the Atlantic, sinking or capturing twenty-two merchant ships. No British warship was fast enough to catch these modern ships and then have the ability to engage them successfully. Other, larger German ships, like the battleship Bismarck, were almost ready to sail and carry on this work. Long-range German bombers, Focke-Wulf Kondors, were also a scourge for British merchant shipping. What Hitler had failed to achieve by air attack and intimidation in 1940, his U-boats, surface warships and maritime bombers were close to achieving in 1941. Britain faced the possibility of its absolutely vital ocean links with the Americans being severed. The Prime Minister issued a simple instruction. For the next four months, Bomber Command's main operational effort was to be directed against those targets which housed the sources of the threats to British shipping.
The Air Ministry passed on these orders to Bomber Command in a directive dated
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HAMBURG
88 aircraft - 40 Hampdens, 25 Whitleys, 16 Wellingtons, 4 Manchesters, 3 Halifaxes - to attack the Blohm & Voss U-boat yards and other industry. This was the first time that Manchesters and Halifaxes had been sent to a target in Germany. No aircraft were lost from this raid.
Hamburg reports that 20 high-explosive and 300-400 incendiary bombs fell in the Blohm & Voss yard, causing damage to the main office block and other parts of the premises, including two slipways on which U-boats were being built. 4 other shipbuilding firms were hit and a large harbour warehouse and its contents were burnt out. A total of 205 fires (18 classed as large) were started; 8 people were killed, 96 injured and 414 bombed out.
BREMEN
86 aircraft - 54 Wellingtons, 32 Blenheims - dispatched, the Wellingtons to attack the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory and the Blenheims the town centre. 2 Wellingtons and 1 Blenheim lost. Photographic reconnaissance showed that 12 high-explosive bombs hit the aircraft factory.
BERLIN
72 aircraft - 30 Hampdens, 28 Wellingtons, 14 Whitleys - to two targets. 3 aircraft, one of each type, lost.
The bombing was very scattered with more bombs in the southern districts of the city than elsewhere. 60 buildings of many kinds were hit, though none was classed as destroyed and only 3 as being severely damaged. 11 people were killed, 24 injured and 80 bombed out.
Minor Operations: 8 aircraft to Calais and Boulogne. 2 O.T.U. sorties, 1 Hampden minelaying in the Elbe. 1 Wellington from the Boulogne raid was lost.
Total effort for the night: 257 sorties, 7 aircraft (2.7 percent) lost.
