, for example, three Whitleys were dispatched in a routine raid to Wesseling with total bomb loads of three and a half tons. Only two of the Whitleys reported being able to bomb the target. In 1944, Bomber Command would judge that nearly 200 four-engined bombers carrying 1,000 tons of bombs would be a reasonable force to attack Wesseling. The second point of interest was the arguments now being put forward in favour of a general attack on industrial German cities instead of the attacks on particular industrial premises within those cities. Those who supported the general-attack concept did so on two grounds: firstly, that it would make better use of a bomber force which was obviously having some difficulty in finding small targets, though the full degree of that difficulty was still not appreciated; and, secondly, that it would be justifiable retaliation for the heavy and seemingly indiscriminate bombing of British cities being carried out that autumn by the Luftwaffe. But, with the exception of one night, the 'general attack' policy was firmly rejected at this time. The exception came on the
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GERMANY, OCCUPIED COUNTRIES
94 aircraft to many targets, mostly German oil and harbour targets. 1 Hampden attacking Kiel was lost.
5 Hampdens laid mines in Kiel Bay and the Elbe.
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11 Blenheims on sea sweeps and cloud-cover raids to Hamburg and Bremen. No targets attacked. No losses.
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GERMANY, OCCUPIED COUNTRIES
84 aircraft to many targets, the largest raid being to a power-station in Berlin by 17 Hampdens. 5 further Hampdens were sent minelaying in the River Gironde. No losses from any operation.
