MINELAYING
56 aircraft to the Frisian Islands. 2 Lancasters lost.
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1 Mosquito bombed the Kiel area and returned safely.
Operational Statistics, 30/31 May to
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(79 days/nights)
Number of days with operations: 54
Number of nights with operations: 60
Number of daylight sorties: 583, from which 27 aircraft (4.6 percent) were lost
Number of night sorties: 11,139, from which 476 aircraft (4.3 percent) were lost
Total sorties: 11,722, from which 503 aircraft (43 percent) were lost
Approximate bomb tonnage in period: 17,095 tons
Averages per 24-hour period: 148.4 sorties, 6.4 aircraft lost, 216.4 tons of bombs dropped
Sources consulted are: our local 'consultant' in Cologne, Herr Erich Quadflieg, who in turn has had access to Cologne's civil records; the British Official History; and Hans Brunswig's Feuersturm ber Hamburg (Brunswig had contact with the Cologne fire brigade).
The war was now half over, though none knew this at the time. Bomber Command's own main campaign, unleashed against the Germans in May 1940, was two and a half years old. The bomber force now had a dynamic commander who was receiving more powerful and effective aircraft, who had weathered a crisis of confidence and secured the political support required to press on with the strategic bombing offensive. And yet all was far from well. Sir Arthur Harris had produced the spectacular 1,000-bomber raids and had dealt some effective blows against a number of German cities and towns but the new device Gee had not produced any revolutionary improvement in target finding and bombing accuracy. For every success at places like Cologne, Lbeck and Rostock there were two or three failures at places like Essen and Duisburg. It is probable that between one half and three quarters of the bombs dropped at night were not even hitting the cities designated as the targets. And all the time the effectiveness of the German defences was increasing. The 43 percent loss rate of the recent period was by far the highest of the night bombing war to date and the trend would continue upwards in the next period.
For some time Bomber Command had been using 'raid leaders' in attempts to improve target-finding. All groups and most squadrons contained a proportion of crews who, by survival and experience or by above-average skill, showed a consistent ability to find and bomb their targets. The obvious suggestion was made that these crews should be gathered together permanently into a Target Finding Force'. The concept of such a force had been floating around the Air Ministry since late in 1941. It was the brainchild of Group Captain S. O. Bufton, who had commanded Nos 10 and 76 Squadrons in 4 Group earlier in the war and who was now Director of Bomber Operations at the Air Ministry. While flying with 10 Squadron, Bufton had pioneered attempts by the best crews in his squadron to find the location of their target by the light of flares and attract other crews to it by firing a coloured Verey light. He had also helped to introduce more reliable flares. But this particular target-finding technique had not been attempted outside Bufton's own squadron. On his being posted to the Air Ministry, he vigorously set about convincing others that the Target Finding Force should be established for the use of the whole of Bomber Command.
Bufton gained the support of his fellow staff officers at the Air Ministry and the idea was put to Harris as soon as Harris took over at Bomber Command in February 1942. The idea was not accepted. Harris opposed the concept of an lite element in Bomber Command, preferring the more experienced men to remain with their squadrons in order to give day-to-day encouragement and inspiration to the newer crews. Harris was supported in this view by all of his group commanders. Bufton made a new suggestion: if the commander-in-chief of Bomber Command would not agree to the formation of a select force, would he allow six ordinary squadrons to be gathered together and to be stationed in close proximity to each other so that they could exchange ideas and develop target-finding tactics.
Sir Arthur Harris still resisted. He looked forward to the day, soon, when all crews would have Gee and bombing cameras; the spirit of competition to obtain the best bombing photographs, he said, would do the rest. A basic principle of the utmost importance to the bombing war was at stake here. It was a conflict between those on the one side who saw the current policy of general-area bombing as a temporary expedient until Bomber Command could develop new techniques to return to the pre-war ideals of the R.A.F. and move back to the bombing of selected individual targets. On the other side were those who saw area bombing as the only way forward, using the increasing weight of Bomber Command to bomb the German cities until the spirit of the industrial workers broke.
The arguments proceeded all through the summer of 1942. Sir Charles Portal had to chose between the advice given to him by his own staff and the wishes of his field commander but he eventually came down on the side of his staff officers and he ordered Harris to abandon his objections and prepare the new force. There was still a delay of several weeks until the Treasury agreed to the principle, requested by Harris, that the men of the new force should be promoted by one rank when they reached a certain standard of efficiency. This was to compensate them for the dangers of the longer tours of duty they would now be expected to fly and for the more rapid promotions they could have expected at their old squadrons. All was finally ready on
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(the 1,000-bomber raids period): 43 percent
The casualty rate during the coming period, that of the opening operations of the Pathfinder Force, would be 4.6 percent! It is not surprising that some of the crews of the night squadrons were losing heart under such a relentlessly increasing casualty rate.
It was recognized that a loss rate exceeding 4 percent would lead to the eventual decline of the force, with insufficient crews managing to survive a first tour of operations to provide the leadership and experience in squadrons for the increasing proportion of raw reinforcements. The situation in the Halifax squadrons of 4 Group at this time provides a good illustration. The Halifax was basically a sound aircraft but it experienced serious technical difficulties in its early models and was suffering heavy casualties. From March to August 1942, 109 Halifaxes were lost from 1,770 sorties, a casualty rate of 6.2 percent. Morale in the Halifax units - 10, 35, 76, 78, 102, 158 and 405 Squadrons - fell and the whole of the Halifax force had to be rested from operations for nearly a month. It was against this background that the Pathfinder Force commenced its operations.
There was one other event of importance at this time. On
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, the same day that the Pathfinder squadrons assembled at their new airfields, twelve B-17 Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force carried out the first American heavy-bomber operation when they attacked railway yards at Rouen. Bomber Command now had a daylight partner in what would become a combined strategic-bombing offensive.
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OSNABRCK
139 aircraft of 5 types. 5 aircraft - 3 Wellingtons, 1 Lancaster, 1 Stirling - lost, 36 percent of the force.
111 crews reported accurate bombing. Osnabrck recorded a sharp attack on the north and north-western parts of the town with 77 dwelling-houses and 4 military buildings destroyed and 125 other buildings seriously damaged, including the town's main hospital, a paper-mill and a copper-wire factory. 7 people were killed and 15 were injured.
Minor Operations: 8 Blenheim Intruders, 4 aircraft minelaying in the Frisians and off Texel and Verdon. No aircraft lost.
The last operational flights in Bomber Command by Blenheims were carried out on this night when 18 Squadron, based at Wattisham, carried out the last Blenheim Intruder operation, attacking airfields at Leeuwarden, Rheine, Twente and Vechta.
