, was another of the great turning-points in Bomber Command's war. The R.A.F. commanders could finally start implementing their pre-war plans and the true strategic-bombing offensive against Germany commenced that night when most of the 108 aircraft allocated to operations were sent to industrial targets in Germany; it was the first occasion that more than 100 aircraft were dispatched. But the realities of the situation prevailed and, after only five nights of industrial bombing, the night bombers had to be brought back to attack bridges and communications nearer the battle front. The full-moon period in the second half of May was fully used for this purpose.
A review of both day and night operations took place at the end of May. Although the ground battle still raged, the Blenheims could not continue at their earlier pace because casualties had been so heavy. Their operations were restricted to allow the squadrons to rest, bring in and train new crews, and generally conserve their strength for the next phase. The Battle of France was clearly being lost; a battle for Britain was likely to follow. In the night-bombing war, the tactical bombing behind the battle front slackened with the ending of the moon period and the bombers increasingly turned their attentions to Germany again. Railways, roads and bridges between Germany and the battlefield continued to be attacked but the greater weight of the offensive was now concentrated on German oil refineries and storage depots. On 4 June the wildly optimistic assessment was made that German oil supplies might be reduced by up to half a million tons within the next two or three months, but postwar German records showed that their oil production suffered a loss through bombing of only 150,000 tons in the next three and a half years! Such unrealism pervaded the whole night offensive to which nearly 70 percent of Bomber Command's effort was devoted during the Battle of France. In addition to the attack on communications, other industrial targets were raided, the minelaying campaign was continued and there was even an attempt to burn the German forests during the dry summer nights. The greatest number of bombers used in one night during this period was only 142; the bomb tonnage dropped on any one target was negligible; the achievement of bombing accuracy by night - as has been stated before and as will be mentioned again and again - was proving incredibly difficult, although few of the bomber commanders were yet prepared to face that unpleasant fact. Some German town reports become available during this period and they illustrate that Bomber Command's night raids were to be little more than pinpricks for months to come.
And so Bomber Command played its part in those momentous battles across the English Channel, although it cannot be claimed that the efforts of the bomber crews and their losses - 147 aircraft in the period - significantly altered the course of the campaign. No new types of aircraft were introduced. The strength available on the outbreak of war had not been significantly increased. A force which had been prepared primarily for day operations was being progressively committed to night bombing. On the credit balance, the strategic bombing of Germany had at last commenced and, tactically, the German invasion of Holland and Belgium had given the bombers the freedom to overfly those countries and this would be their route to Germany for the years ahead.
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COMMUNICATIONS IN GERMANY AND HOLLAND
18 Wellingtons to the Aachen area, 12 Whitleys to Mnchengladbach, 12 Hampdens to Breda and Roosendaal. 1 Hampden lost.
22 Hampdens minelaying near Kiel and Copenhagen.
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BELGIUM
24 Blenheims to attack communications and bridges; 3 aircraft lost.
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RUHR INDUSTRY AND RAILWAYS
99 aircraft - 39 Wellingtons, 36 Hampdens, 24 Whitleys - to 16 different targets in the Ruhr area. Factories at Dortmund, Sterkrade and Castrop-Rauxel were designated as targets for 9 aircraft each; all other targets had fewer aircraft. 81 aircraft reported bombing at their primary targets or at alternatives over a wide area. This was the first strategic bombing of German industry in the Second World War. No aircraft were shot down over Germany but 1 Wellington, of 115 Squadron, blown off course by an unexpected wind, crashed into high ground at Burney near Rouen in France. Flight Lieutenant A. E. Pringle and his 4 crewmen were all killed, the first R.A.F. casualties of the strategic bombing war.
A report from Cologne says that bombs aimed at the IG-Werk at Dormagen hit a large farm and killed a dairyman, Franz Romeike, who became Cologne's first airraid casualty, the first of approximately 20,000 Cologne people killed in air raids and artillery assault during the war. Another report says that Herr Romeike had switched on an outside light by mistake while on the way to the toilet and that this light promptly attracted a stick of high-explosive bombs. 5 more people in Cologne were wounded.
Another report, from Mnster, describes the dropping of 6 bombs in the town which caused light damage and wounded 2 people, although Mnster was not on the list of towns to be attacked and no bomber reported attacking it as an alternative. The Mnster report continues: 'This bombing created a sensation and, for days on end, thousands of inquisitive people were attracted to the scene.'
12 further aircraft - 6 Wellingtons, 6 Whitleys - attacked German communications in Belgium without loss. This brought the total number of aircraft operating on this night to 111, the first time that more than 100 bombers were dispatched on one occasion since the war began.
