is a more realistic date to mark the opening of the new phase. So, after a pause following the disastrous Nuremberg raid, the bomber crews found themselves flying a series of raids on railway targets in France and Belgium with a view to isolating the German forces in Normany from any form of railway-born reinforcement. There were also raids on military camps, ammunition depots and explosives and armament factories in France and Belgium and, just before the invasion, on radio and radar stations and coastal gun batteries. There was one aspect of the bombing of which the bomber crews were unaware. A massive Allied deception plan was in operation to persuade the Germans that the main landing would be in the Pas de Calais area, 150 miles further up the coast from Normandy and the same distance nearer to Germany. Bomber Command played a full part in this deception. For every bomb which needed to be dropped on the French railway system leading to Normandy, almost as many bombs were dropped further north. Bomber Command shared these duties with the American Eighth Air Force heavy bombers and with the Allied tactical day-bomber forces. On a few nights, when Bomber Command was not required for the invasion targets, cities in Germany were attacked, but only in the most favourable of conditions. Few risks were taken.
Bomber Command was more successful in attacking the small, sensitive targets in France and Belgium than anyone had ever hoped. The use of a Master Bomber became a standard feature of these raids, the crews of such men often becoming casualties as they remained flying over the target area throughout a raid. Much of the credit for the success also goes to the dedication shown by the bomber crews concerned; they were delighted to be associated with the invasion and liberation of Europe, one of the great events of the war, and happy to be attacking targets of an obviously more military nature than the German cities. There was relief too that the long winter of costly and often disappointing raids to Germany was over. There was, however, one very sad aspect about the raids in France and Belgium; however dedicated the crews and accurate the bombing, reports from these places will show that many civilians who had already endured long years of German occupation would die by Allied bombs and never see the dawn of liberation of their homes.
One tactical factor in the comparative success of the pre-invasion raids should be mentioned. On the night of 5/6 April, 144 Lancasters of 5 Group attacked and, with unusual accuracy, destroyed an aircraft factory at Toulouse. The marking for this raid was carried out by 617 Squadron, not by Pathfinder aircraft. In the first low-level Mosquito marking flight of the war, Wing Commander Leonard Cheshire dropped his markers on his third pass over the factory building. The target was well defended but the Mosquito was so fast that it was not hit. Two Lancasters of 617 Squadron dropped further markers which were so reliably placed that the resultant bombing was of near perfect concentration. The crews carrying out this bombing were from ordinary squadrons of 5 Group, mostly without any special training. Within hours of the Toulouse operation, Sir Arthur Harris informed Air Vice-Marshal Cochrane that 5 Group could now operate as an independent force using its own marking techniques. The two Pathfinder Lancaster squadrons in 8 Group - 83 and 97 Squadrons - which had originally served in 5 Group and whose crews were largely drawn from 5 Group, were returned to Cochrane. More Mosquitoes were provided for 617 Squadron and 8 Group was also ordered to release a Mosquito squadron, 627 Squadron, to 5 Group. Air Vice-Marshal Cochrane now had available: twelve ordinary Lancaster squadrons, two squadrons of Pathfinder Lancasters, a squadron of Mosquitoes and the specialist 617 Squadron. A '5 Group marking technique' was quickly developed, based on low-level identification of the target and marking by Mosquitoes, with the Lancasters of 83 and 97 Squadrons providing flare forces and backing-up marking which could be assessed and corrected by the Mosquitoes. The 5 Group method was used with much success over several targets in France as well as over some of the German cities. The 5 Group method was not perfect and there were disadvantages. The weather had to be clear; 5 Group could not penetrate cloud any better than 8 Group could. The delay in calling in the main force of 5 Group bombers sometimes allowed the arrival of German fighters and led to heavy bomber losses. But the average 5 Group bombing error during the next few months was 380 yards, compared to the average error of 680 yards when the marking was based on Oboe, the method employed as a basis of most other attacks on French and Belgian targets. This reduction of error was of vital importance in attacking small targets.
The establishment of 5 Group as a semi-independent force was the only major change at this time. The Mosquito growth in 8 Group continued and there was a modest increase of strength in most other groups. The Lancaster expansion proceeded only slowly after this type had been forced to shoulder the main burden in recent operations to Germany. The same factor led to the slow phasing out of the Stirlings in 3 Group, whose squadrons were waiting for Lancaster replacements, but the process of replacing the less satisfactory version of the Halifax by the Mark III version was completed just before the invasion; all of 4 Group and part of 6 Group would then use the Mark IIIs until the end of the war in Europe. The first Free French squadrons in Bomber Command - 346 and 347 - were formed in 4 Group just before the invasion. It is ironic that their first raids should have been on targets in their mother country; the Frenchmen would fly nearly 3,000 sorties before the war in Europe ended.
The average casualty rate fell. The Luftwaffe night-fighter force was still powerful but the shorter raids did not allow the German Tame Boar fighter tactics to be developed fully. The introduction of long-range fighter escorts for the American daylight raids, particularly the provision of the P-51 Mustang fighter, often drew the German night fighters into battle by day or caused the night fighters to be strafed on the ground. A decline started which would never be reversed and history would look back on January to March of 1944 as the zenith of the German night-fighter fortunes, with their successes at Magdeburg, Leipzig, Berlin and Nuremberg never being repeated. There would continue to be some setbacks and the diary will identify the raids when the German fighters caused heavy loss to part of the bomber force, but such nights were not frequent and the fighters never caught the whole of Bomber Command at once.
31 March/
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MINOR OPERATIONS
3 Oboe Mosquitoes to Essen, 28 aircraft on Resistance operations, 15 O.T.U. sorties. 1 Halifax on a Resistance supply-dropping operation was lost.
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HANNOVER
35 Mosquitoes bombed the city through thin cloud. No aircraft lost.
Minor Operations: Mosquitoes - 7 to Aachen, 6 to Krefeld and 2 to La Glacerie flying-bomb site, 1 R.C.M. sortie, 4 Serrate patrols, 34 Halifaxes minelaying off the Dutch coast, 9 aircraft on Resistance operations. No aircraft lost.
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and flew Lancasters from Little Staughton until the end of the war.
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
582 Squadron flew 2,157 Lancaster sorties and lost 28 aircraft (1.3 percent) in 165 raids. 8 further Lancasters were destroyed in crashes.
POINTS OF INTEREST
Victoria Cross: Captain E. E. Swales, posthumously, Pforzheim,
