OSTERFELD
149 Lancasters and 17 Mosquitoes of 1 and 8 Groups to attack the railway yards. The only details available are Bomber Command's estimates that the railway sidings were 35 percent damaged and the 'facilities' 20 percent damaged. 2 Lancasters lost.
OSLO FJORD
28 Lancasters of 5 Group attacked cruisers in the fjord but no hits were scored. 1 Lancaster lost.
Minor Operations: 77 Mosquitoes to Berlin and 12 to Ludwigshafen, 33 R.C.M. sorties, 33 Mosquito patrols, 16 Halifaxes and 10 Lancasters minelaying in the Kattegat. 1 minelaying Lancaster lost.
Operational Statistics,
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(137_ days/nights)
Number of nights with operations: 115
Number of days with operations: 116 (20 of these involved fewer than 10 sorties)
Number of night sorties: 43,819, from which 497 aircraft (1.1 percent) were lost
Number of day sorties: 28,992, from which 199 aircraft (0.7 percent) were lost
Total sorties: 72,881, from which 696 aircraft (1.0 percent) were lost
Approximate bomb tonnage in period: 265,708 tons
Averages per 24-hour period: 530.0 sorties, 5.1 aircraft lost, 1,932.4 tons of bombs dropped
The directive is printed in the British Official History, Vol. IV, pp. 172-3.
ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 177-8.
See Chapter Ten of Harris's Bomber Offensive (Collins, 1947), for his detailed views on this subject.
Because of the declining bomber-casuality rate, percentage losses for individual raids are no longer recorded unless of particular interest.
K T B Luftgaukommando VII, Bundesarchiv.
Effects of City Raids, Darmstadt, p. 9a.
Feuersturm ber Hamburg, op. cit., p. 340.
Feuersturm ber Hamburg, op. cit., p. 346.
The Speer interrogations are recorded in the British Official History, Vol. IV, pp. 378-95.
The final period of these diaries does not open with a clearly defined change in Bomber Command's policy or operations; the last four months of the war in Europe were really a continuation of that phase which had commenced with the Allied break-out from Normandy. But the opportunity is taken to split this final phase of the opening of that bright New Year of 1945, so that the progress of the war, the background of the direction of the bomber operations and other changes affecting the final few months of Bomber Command's efforts during the Second World War can be described.
The offensive in the Ardennes ran its course; the Germans failed to capture either Brussels or Antwerp. Their units were harried from the air, ran out of supplies, and were eventually stopped by a determined defence, mainly by the American troops on whose sector the blow had fallen, though some British troops were involved. Hitler's last gamble in the West had failed but the Germans had imposed a setback to the Allied timetable. The Ardennes front was not finally stabilized until the end of January 1945 and the Allied armies then took several weeks to close up to the Rhine, ready for the assault on Germany's last main line of defence on that broad river. It was not until late in March that the Rhine was crossed in strength and the final breakthrough into Germany commenced, but then events moved fast. The Ruhr was encircled at the beginning of April but held out for eighteen days before the 325,000 troops trapped there finally surrendered those ruined cities to the Allies. American troops linked up with the Russians a few days later on the River Elbe. Berlin fell to the Russians. Montgomery's British and Canadian troops liberated the remainder of Holland and raced northwards to capture Bremen, Hamburg and Lbeck and to meet the Russians on the Baltic coast. Hitler committed suicide and a few days later the war in Europe was over.
But the arguments over the use of Bomber Command continued, almost to the very end. The official priority of attack against oil targets, with the second priority against transportation, remained unchanged. There was a small scare in January when Bomber Command and the Americans were ordered to attack targets associated with the production of German jet aircraft and the new types of 'Schnorkel'-equipped U-boats. These were difficult targets for Bomber Command but some effort was devoted to them. The real argument, however, was over the employment of Bomber Command's main strength. The Air Ministry was still disappointed that Sir Arthur Harris was devoting so much effort to the general attack on German cities at this late stage of the war, at a time when so many improvements in bombing techniques had become available and when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were ordering the all-out attack on oil and transportation targets. The Official History describes a long exchange of correspondence between Sir Charles Portal and Sir Arthur Harris on this subject. But a study of the diary entries for the last few weeks of the war shows that Harris was devoting more effort to the attack on oil and communications than is popularly believed. The weather was often a problem. Harris may not have sent every sortie possible against the selective targets, but he certainly dispatched a very high proportion of the effort available when conditions were suitable. Comment in the Official History, the tenor of the correspondence between Portal and Harris and the view of many post-war publications tend to obscure that fact. But it is still true to say that great raids were sometimes sent, both in good and not-so-good weather conditions, to carry out area attacks on German cities, some of which had little industrial importance. These remarks do not apply to the raid on Dresden, which later caused such a furore; Dresden was attacked in special circumstances which will be described in the appropriate diary entry.
47 (a and b). The aircraft repair organization. A Lancaster which crash-landed on returning from Germany is recovered and repaired. According to the notice on the wall of the workshop, the aircraft should be ready for operation within a month of the crash-landing.
The outcome of this continued area bombing at such a late stage of the war led to Harris being immediately shuffled off into the sidelines as soon as the war was over. It led to the present-day R.A.F. preference for honouring the men of the Battle of Britain - in which fewer airmen died than in one Bomber Command raid to Nuremberg in March 1944 - and the long official reluctance to acknowledge the years of effort and sacrifice by the men of Bomber Command.
So Harris remained to the end but the opportunity was taken to change some of the long-serving group commanders. Air Vice-Marshals Rice of 1 Group, Carr of 4 Group and Cochrane of 5 Group all went in February. There was no criticism of performance in these changes, merely the desire to give experience of command to a new generation of leaders before the war finished. One long-serving group commander -Pathfinders Bennett - was not rested; the R.A.F. had no plans for the Pathfinders after the war. (8 Group was disbanded in December 1945. Also to go in 1945 were 4 Group - to become part of Transport Command; 5 Group - surplus to requirement; 6 (Canadian) Group - its squadrons all returned to Canada; and 100 Group - its functions incorporated into other units.)
The final months of operations were flown. January was a quieter month, because of the weather, but then the level of operations rose to a crescendo. March, with a hectic round of raids by day as well as by night, produced a greater weight of bombs dropped by Bomber Command - 67,637 tons - than in any month of the war, the same tonnage as the command had dropped in the first thirty-four months of the war! New cities were visited - places like Hanau, Wrzburg, Pforzheim, Wiesbaden, Worms in the West and, further away, Chemnitz, Dresden, Dessau and Potsdam. Oil plants of various kinds were still bombed; many of these targets were now deep in Eastern Germany. Railway yards, canals and bridges were still attacked. German towns near the battle front were reduced to ruins. The German defences continued to decline in effectiveness, although there were occasional flashes of action by the night fighters and some sharp losses were suffered. The weather remained a constant enemy. It was almost all over by the end of March and most of Bomber Command's targets in the remaining five weeks of the war were strictly military ones. The strategic bomber offensive was over.
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DORTMUND-EMS CANAL
102 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes of 5 Group were dispatched to attack the stretch of the canal near Ladbergen which the Germans had once more repaired. The raid was successful and the canal was breached again. 2 Lancasters lost.
One of the Lancaster casualties - a 9 Squadron aircraft piloted by Flying Officer R. F. H. Denton - was hit by Flak shortly after bombing and was set on fire. Flight Sergeant George Thompson, the wireless operator, rescued both gunners from their burning turrets but suffered severe burns in doing so. The Lancaster crash-landed at Brussels and Thompson was rushed to hospital but he died 3 weeks later. The mid-upper gunner, Sergeant E. J. Potts, also died of his burns. Flight Sergeant Thompson was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his courage. This was the second Victoria Cross awarded to a 5 Group man while attacking the Dortmund-Ems Canal; Flight Lieutenant R. A. B. Learoyd of 49 Squadron received the decoration for his bravery in an August 1940 raid.
Railway Tunnels
17 Mosquitoes of 8 Group to bomb the mouths of tunnels in the wooded and hilly Eifel region between the Rhine and the Ardennes battle area. Each Mosquito was to dive and attempt to place its 4,000-lb bomb fitted with a short delayed-action fuze in the mouth of a tunnel. 14 tunnels were attacked in this way. 1 Mosquito lost.
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MITTELLAND CANAL
152 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes of 5 Group carried out an accurate attack on the Gravenhorst section of the canal. Half a mile of banks were pitted with bomb craters and some parts were breached. No aircraft lost.
VOHWINKEL
146 aircraft of 3 Group successfully attacked the railway yards. 1 Lancaster lost.
DORTMUND
105 Halifaxes of 4 Group and 18 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitoes of 8 Group attempted to bomb a benzol plant but the attack was scattered and the plant was not hit. No aircraft lost.
Minor Operations: 28 Mosquitoes to Hanau and 27 to Hannover (both 'spoof' raids), 42 R.C.M. sorties, 59 Mosquito patrols. No aircraft lost. The 100 Group Mosquitoes claimed 6 German night fighters destroyed.
Total effort for the night: 598 sorties, 1 aircraft (0.2 percent) lost; 5 aircraft crashed in England.
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The squadron's Lancasters were fitted with bomb bays capable of taking Tallboy bombs in 1944 and 1945 and were the only Main Force aircraft to carry out precision bombing with 617 Squadron.
10 SQUADRON
SERVICE
In 4 Group from the outbreak of the war until the end, though with short detachments to Coastal Command and the Middle East. Equipped with Whitleys until December 1941 and then with Halifaxes. Based at Dishforth, Leeming and Melbourne.
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Raids Flown
Whitleys - 208 bombing, 15 leaflet
Halifaxes - 325 bombing, 61 minelaying
Total - 533 bombing, 61 minelaying, 15 leaflet = 609 raids
Sorties and Losses
Whitleys - 1,430 sorties, 47 aircraft lost (3.3 percent)
Halifaxes - 4,803 sorties, 109 aircraft lost (2.3 percent)
Total - 6,233 sorties, 156 aircraft last (2.5 percent)
POINTS OF INTEREST
An operational squadron from the outbreak of war, flying night operations in the first week.
Made the first flights over Berlin, dropping leaflets on
